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ABSTRACT
Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate
honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or
personalized support, diﬀering from country to country. However,
little is known about how these diﬀerent instruments and
taxpayers’ trust inﬂuence the generation of interaction climates
between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply,
and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines
the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes
tax authorities’ instruments into diﬀerent qualities of power of
authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-
based and implicit), to shed light on the eﬀect of diﬀerences
between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey
data from taxpayers from three culturally diﬀerent countries (N =
700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust,
interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support
assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of
coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit
trust, which leads to an antagonistic climate and enforced
motivation. The connection from legitimate power to tax
compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The
relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is
mediated by a conﬁdence climate and committed cooperation.
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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Introduction
Tax authorities apply diﬀerent measures to increase tax compliance. These measures diﬀer
from country to country. Nevertheless, many practical and theoretical accounts such as the
slippery slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler 2007) have categorized diﬀerent
measures into two basics approaches: the power approach and the trust approach (Feld
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Katharina Gangl gangl@psych.uni-goettingen.de Department of Economic and Social Psychology,
Georg August University Goettingen, Goßlerstraße 14, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
POLICY STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2019.1577375
and Frey 2007; Kirchler 2007; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). The power approach (also
termed deterrence or the command and control approach) relies on frequent audits and
severe ﬁnes in case of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). In contrast, the trust
approach originates from transparency, fair procedures, or the conviction that paying
taxes honestly is a binding social norm (Braithwaite 2003a; Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl
2008; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). The mutual inﬂuence, interaction, and dynamic
between these two approaches is seen as important for tax compliance. Whereas some
authors suggested that power and trust mutually enhance each other’s eﬀect on compli-
ance, others assumed that power can also erode trust and in turn could reduce compliance
(Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 2005; Das and Teng 1998). However, only few studies exist
that examined this dynamic empirically (Hofmann et al. 2017).
To explain the dynamic between power and trust, the original slippery slope framework
was extended by diﬀerentiating the power of tax authorities into coercive and legitimate
power and trust in tax authorities into reason-based and implicit trust (Gangl,
Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). Based on this, the extended slippery slope framework
(eSSF) describes how the diﬀerent qualities of power and trust interact with each other
and lead to speciﬁc relationship climates between tax authorities and taxpayers and to
tax motivations that determine tax payments (Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). Coer-
cive power is suggested to decrease implicit trust in tax authorities and to lead to an antag-
onistic climate and an enforced motivation to pay taxes. Legitimate power fosters reason-
based trust, a service climate, and a voluntary motivation to pay taxes. Based on positive
experiences with tax authorities, the eSSF suggests that over time, reason-based trust
evolves to implicit trust, which leads to a conﬁdence climate with a committed motivation
to pay taxes (Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). Whereas the original slippery slope fra-
mework received empirical support in numerous survey studies and experiments (e.g.
Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger 2011; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler 2010),
only some of the assumptions of the eSSF were tested, mostly based on experiments (e.g.
Hartl et al. 2015; Hofmann et al. 2014). Throughout empirical analyses of all dynamics
between power and trust that are assumed in the eSSF and studies based on data from
real taxpayers living in diﬀerent countries are rare. Closing this empirical gap allows an
examination of the eSSF and tests whether tax authorities’ approaches directly or indirectly
inﬂuence tax compliance via changing the perceived relationship with authorities and tax-
payers’ motivations. Testing eSSF assumptions with data from diﬀerent countries also
informs whether diﬀerent approaches aimed to increase tax compliance work in the same
manner independent of the country and cultural speciﬁcs in which they are applied.
The aim of the present paper is to test the eSSF assumption on the psychological processes
and consequences of the power-trust dynamic. Therefore, the present paper examines the
underlying psychological processes that allow power and trust approaches to inﬂuence tax
compliance. To increase the generalizability of found results and to test whether tax auth-
orities’ approaches have similar consequences in diﬀerent countries, we also aim to
analyse taxpayer data from diﬀerent countries that have varying tax cultures.
The extended slippery slope framework
Tax researchers agree that tax authorities need to apply the full range of possible instru-
ments in order to guarantee tax compliance from citizens (Alm and Torgler 2011;
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Braithwaite 2003a, 2003b). These instruments include the classical deterrence approach,
based on the force of the law through coercive audits and ﬁnes, and alternative approaches
including regulation, incentives, participation, fairness, or support and service. Although
the positive eﬀect of each of these approaches on tax compliance received much theoretical
and empirical support (Alm and Torgler 2011; Blackwell 2007; Murphy 2004; Wahl, Kas-
tlunger, and Kirchler 2010), their dynamic and joint inﬂuence on tax compliance is still
largely unexplored (Gobena and Van Dijke 2016).
Experiments from ﬁelds other than tax compliance indicated that coercive control and
punishment is more eﬀective if applied in a fair versus unfair manner (Mooijman et al.
2017; Verboon and van Dijke 2011). Similar experiments demonstrated that punishments
exerted by a trusted authority have stronger eﬀects on moral judgments about rule-break-
ing behaviour than punishments exerted by an untrusted authority (Mulder, Verboon, and
De Cremer 2009). A meta-analysis also showed that punishments are more eﬀective in
countries in which general trust is high compared to low (Balliet, Mulder, and van
Lange 2013). On the other hand, it is claimed that coercive control and punishment
break the social contract between authorities and citizens, decreasing trust between auth-
orities and fellow citizens (Feld and Frey 2007; Kramer 1999; Tenbrunsel and Messick
1999); this in turn can lead to lower cooperation (Ariel 2012; Gangl et al. 2014;
Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001). Thus, coercive punishment, trust, and fair pro-
cedures can mutually work together to either strengthen or weaken each other and in turn
have diﬀerent eﬀects on cooperation with authorities. However, thorough theoretical and
empirical examinations of the power-trust dynamic, particularly in tax research, is
missing. For instance, it is not clear how audits and ﬁnes may increase trust in the tax
system instead of decreasing it. Insights into these mechanisms could fortify our under-
standing of contradictory results from studies that have shown a positive eﬀect (Hassel-
dine et al. 2007), no eﬀect (Ariel 2012), or even negative eﬀects of audits and ﬁnes
(Gangl et al. 2014; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001).
The eSSF aims to explain these contradictory ﬁndings and the dynamics and inter-
actions between diﬀerent approaches. Therefore, the eSSF categorizes tax authorities’
diﬀerent approaches into various qualities of power (i.e. coercive power and legitimate
power) and diﬀerent qualities of trust (i.e. reason-based trust and implicit trust).
The power of tax authorities, which is deﬁned based on the theory of the “bases of social
power” (French and Raven 1959; Pierro et al. 2012), is diﬀerentiated into coercive power
and legitimate power (Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998). These two qualities of
power are conceptualized as independent qualities; they can be applied alone or in com-
bination with each other.
Coercive power represents the power to punish and the power to reward; thus, it
becomes either a negative and positive incentive for behaviour. Examples of punishment
are ﬁnes or negative disclosure through transparent tax returns (Bø, Slemrod, and Thor-
esen 2014) or black lists (Perez-Truglia and Troiano 2015). Examples of rewards are well-
ness vouchers for timely payment (Koessler et al. 2016) or the promise of privileged
treatment (Simone, Sansing, and Seidman 2013 ). Both punishments and rewards likely
crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci 1971) and are seen as a form of coercion (Raven,
Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998).
Legitimate power is deﬁned as the perception that authorities work based on a legiti-
mate foundation, expertise and information provision, and a positive reputation
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(Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998). Diﬀerent subcategories of legitimate power
are related to transparency and fairness (Wenzel 2002), legitimate regulation (Murphy
2005), taxpayer’s voice and participation (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996),
the provision of relevant information (Alm et al. 2010), and to supportive services
(Gangl et al. 2013).
Based on the socio-cognitive trust theory (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010), trust is
diﬀerentiated into reason-based and implicit trust. Reason-based trust is deﬁned as the
deliberate decision to trust tax authorities based on their perceived goals; their perceived
competence, motivation, and benevolence; and perceived supportive external circum-
stances. Reason-based trust is related to tax knowledge (Eriksen and Fallan 1996), the per-
ceived competence and good intentions of authorities (e.g. Gangl et al. 2013; Murphy
2004), and perceived institutional quality and corruption (e.g. Cummings et al. 2009).
In contrast, implicit trust is an automatic and associative reaction to a stimuli such as a
friendly face or voice or oﬃcial-looking documents (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010).
However, reason-based and implicit trust are related. Along System 1 and System 2 con-
ceptualizations, it is assumed that trust is ﬁrst based on rational considerations and
becomes implicit over time as a result of positive experiences (Evans 2008). Implicit
trust summarizes determinants of tax compliance related to marketing and newspaper
campaigns (Cyan, Koumpias, and Martinez-Vazquez 2017), social norms of tax honesty
(Hallsworth et al. 2017), and the perception of a shared identity (i.e. patriotism; Gangl,
Torgler, and Kirchler 2016). Nudges, such as automatic reminders or prepopulated tax
forms (Behavioural Insights Team 2011; Chirico et al. 2017), are also likely to trigger auto-
matic and implicit trust.
The eSSF assumes that two main mechanisms drive the dynamic between the diﬀerent
qualities of power and trust that in turn impact the perceived relationship climate between
authorities and taxpayers and taxpayers’ motivation to comply (Figure 1; Gangl,
Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). First, the eSSF suggests a negative relationship between
coercive power and implicit trust, which leads either to an antagonistic or conﬁdence-
based climate. In an antagonistic climate, coercive power is high and implicit trust is
low, and tax authorities are perceived to persecute taxpayers primarily interested in catch-
ing them as tax evaders. As a consequence, taxpayers pay their taxes because they feel
enforced to do so by control and punishment (Braithwaite 2003a, 2003b; Feld and Frey
Figure 1. Extended slippery slope framework (Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015).
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2002). In a conﬁdence climate, implicit trust is high whereas coercive power is low. The
interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers is characterized by mutual trust and
respect; therefore, harsh coercive power is not perceived as necessary. In such a climate,
taxpayers feel committed to the tax system and see taxpaying as their moral obligation.
Second, the eSSF suggests a positive relationship between legitimate power and reason-
based trust that fosters a service climate. In a service climate, tax authorities and taxpayers
have a professional, bureaucratic relationship in which tax authorities as service providers
interact with taxpayers as clients (Alm and Torgler 2011; Braithwaite 2003b).
Based on these assumptions, it can be suggested that a pure coercive deterrence
approach has a negative eﬀect on trust, interaction climates, and motivation, and in
turn tax compliance intentions. In contrast, if authorities’ power is perceived to be legit-
imate, or if authorities’ coercive power is combined with legitimate power, a positive eﬀect
on trust, climate, motivation, and tax compliance can be expected.
Experiments on the eﬀects of coercive power and legitimate power, applied solely or in
combination, largely conﬁrmed the above mentioned assumptions (Gangl et al. 2017;
Hartl et al. 2015; Hofmann et al. 2014, 2017). In these experiments, participants were
asked to act as self-employed taxpayers who must pay taxes on a given income. Low
versus high coercive and legitimate power was manipulated by describing tax authorities
as applying lenient or severe controls (to manipulate coercive power) with ill or well-
trained tax oﬃcers (to manipulate legitimate power). These experiments showed, as
expected, that coercive power but not legitimate power increases taxpayers’ reactance
and reduces implicit trust in tax authorities, which in turn leads to an antagonistic
climate and enforced motivation to comply (Gangl et al. 2017; Hofmann et al. 2014).
However, these experiments only analysed the eﬀect of coercive and legitimate power
but not trust (largely due to the diﬃculty of experimentally manipulating implicit
trust). In addition, survey studies on representative samples of self-employed taxpayers
from Austria and the Netherlands on the correlation of diﬀerent motivations to comply
(i.e. enforced compliance, voluntary cooperation, and committed cooperation with tax
compliance intentions) were conducted (Gangl et al. 2013). These studies showed that
enforced compliance was negatively related to tax compliance, whereas voluntary and
committed cooperation were positively correlated to tax compliance. Thorough survey
studies that analysed all assumed dynamics between power and trust in the eSSF are
rare. One exception oﬀered conﬁrmation of the framework (Gangl et al. 2016).
However, this study was small in sample size, based on just one country, and did not
include tax compliance intentions. Hence, it is still not clear how robust the assumed
dynamics are between power, trust, interaction climates, motivation to comply, and tax
compliance.
National diﬀerences in tax behaviour
In the present study, we used data from three European countries that strongly vary con-
cerning authorities’ perceived power and citizens’ trust in authorities: Austria, Finland,
and Hungary. According to the European Value Survey (2011), only 15.7% of citizens
in Austria and 19.1% in Finland claim that the state should increase control of ﬁrms. In
contrast, 43.8% of Hungarians demand more frequent and eﬃcient control. This might
indicate that in Hungary there are higher authoritarian attitudes and that authority is
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perceived as more legitimate than in Finland or Austria. Particularly, trust in authorities
diﬀers across the three countries (e.g. Kogler et al. 2013). Data from the European Value
Survey (2011) showed that citizens’ trust in national authorities (i.e. the parliament) is
highest in Finland (42.1% of the Finnish have conﬁdence in parliament), followed by
Austria (29.9%) and Hungary (20.7%). The data from the European Value Survey indi-
cated that Finland is the democratic extreme, whereas Hungary is on the authoritarian
extreme and Austria represents a middle position between the two.
The aim of the present study is to test the eSSF assumptions by examining whether the
relationship between power, trust, and tax compliance intentions is mediated by perceived
tax climates and motivations. Figure 2 visualizes our hypotheses. To increase the robust-
ness of our results, we examined the data of taxpayers from three countries diﬀering in
regulation and citizens’ trust – Austria, Finland, and Hungary – who likely also diﬀer con-
cerning power and trust, perceived tax climates, and motivation to comply with taxes.
Method
Samples and procedure
Overall, 700 taxpayers (253 Austrians, 223 Finnish, and 224 Hungarians) completed an
online survey. The ﬁrst item on the questionnaire was a ﬁlter item asking whether partici-
pants had ever paid taxes in the past. Only those participants who indicated that they had
experience with taxpaying continued the survey. After additional exclusion of participants
who denied the question, “I have read all written instructions and questions carefully and
have given my personal opinion”, data of 249 Austrian (57% male; Mage = 35.06, SD =
Figure 2. (a – c) The extended slippery slope framework and tax compliance.
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12.82), 219 Finnish (48% male;Mage = 45.94, SD = 13.34), and 222 Hungarian participants
(39% male; Mage = 39.98, SD = 12.50) were considered in the analyses. Participants in
Austria and Hungary were recruited from acquaintances of university members.
Finnish participants were recruited by a market research agency and received a choice
of low-price items as a reward for participation.
Material
The online questionnaire was used to assess (a) perceived coercive power (three items; e.g.
“Tax authorities punishes severely”), (b) perceived legitimate power (seven items; e.g. “Tax
authorities do share understandable information”), (c) implicit trust (three items; e.g. “I
trust tax authorities most of the time automatically”), (d) reason-based trust (14 items;
e.g. “I trust tax authorities because they have committed employees”), (e) perceived antag-
onistic climate (three items; e.g. “Between the tax authority and taxpayer there exists a
climate of inconsiderateness”), (f) perceived service climate (three items; e.g. “The relation-
ship between the tax authority and taxpayer is service-oriented in nature”), (g) perceived
conﬁdence climate (three items; e.g. “The relationship between the tax authority and tax-
payer is characterized by joint responsibility”), (h) enforced compliance (four items; e.g.
“When I pay taxes, I do so because I know I will be audited”), (i) voluntary cooperation
(four items; e.g. “When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax authority will probably reci-
procate my cooperation”), and (j) committed cooperation (four items; e.g. “When I pay
taxes, I do so because I feel a moral obligation to pay taxes”). Participants were also sur-
veyed on tax compliance (one item; “How likely will you pay your taxes for the current
year correctly and in full extent to the tax authority?”) and socio-demographic character-
istics. Scales and items are based on Hofmann et al. (2017) and Gangl et al. (2015) and
were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Cronbach’s
α for all scales were suﬃcient (see Table 1).
Results
In the following section, our preliminary analysis aimed to show that Austria, Finland, and
Hungary signiﬁcantly diﬀer regarding perceived power, taxpayer trust, interaction cli-
mates, and motivation for tax compliance. After that, we tested the dynamic between
power and trust, interaction climates, motivation, and tax compliance intentions by apply-
ing a mediation analysis.
Preliminary analysis: diﬀerences between Austrian, Finish, and Hungarian
taxpayers
To conﬁrm that Austria, Finland, and Hungary diﬀer concerning power and trust, per-
ceived tax climates, and motivations to comply with taxes, ANOVAs (Table 1) were com-
puted. Coercive power was perceived as higher in Hungary than in Austria and Finland (F
(687, 2) = 11.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03), whereas legitimate power was signiﬁcantly perceived as
higher in Finland than in Austria and Hungary (F(687, 2) = 27.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = .07). Trust
– both implicit (F(687, 2) = 9.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03) and reason-based (F(687, 2) = 19.24,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .05) – was higher in Finland than in Austria and Hungary. An antagonistic
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Table 1. Reliabilities, means, standard deviations, and partial inter-correlations of the slippery slope framework scales for Austria, Finland, and Hungary.
α
AUT
M (SD)
FIN
M (SD)
HUN
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Coercive Power .75 4.60 (1.41) 4.58 (1.38) 5.12 (1.22)
2 Legitimate Power .81 3.85 (0.91) 4.27 (0.96) 3.65 (0.84) −.12**
3 Implicit Trust .93 3.84 (1.88) 4.40 (1.65) 3.72 (1.65) −.13** .54***
4 Reason-based Trust .91 3.36 (1.04) 3.98 (1.16) 3.48 (1.21) −.15*** .66*** .73***
5 Antagonistic Climate .90 3.94 (1.61) 3.72 (1.67) 4.44 (1.72) .42*** −.33*** −.35*** −.35***
6 Service Climate .86 3.14 (1.41) 4.16 (1.49) 2.76 (1.35) −.25*** .57*** .43*** .58*** −.38***
7 Conﬁdence Climate .88 3.05 (1.39) 3.64 (1.48) 2.62 (1.30) −.22*** .62*** .56*** .70*** −.44*** .68***
8 Enforced Compliance .84 4.11 (1.47) 3.75 (1.54) 3.67 (1.69) .23*** .03 −.07 −.04 .31*** −.01 −.08*
9 Voluntary Cooperation .75 3.34 (1.30) 3.80 (1.34) 2.89 (1.33) −.06 .52*** .41*** .53*** −.20*** .48*** .51*** .17***
10 Committed Cooperation .90 4.90 (1.56) 5.49 (1.32) 5.50 (1.42) −.07 .36*** .35*** .41*** −.17*** .23*** .26*** −.16*** .26***
11 Intended tax behaviour 6.13 (1.54) 6.34 (1.15) 6.28 (1.23) .02 .11** .15*** .15*** −.11** .07 .08* −.09* .07 .27***
Note. α = Cronbach-α, AUT = Austria, FIN = Finland, HUN = Hungary.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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climate was perceived as higher in Hungary than in Austria and Finland (F(687, 2) = 11.02,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .03). A service (F(687, 2) = 57.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14) and conﬁdence climate
(F(687, 2) = 29.87, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08) were both perceived as highest in Finland, as
second highest in Austria, and as lowest in Hungary. Finish and Hungarian participants
appeared to feel less enforced to pay taxes than Austrians (F(687, 2) = 5.25, p < .01, ηp
2
= .02). Finnish participants were the highest motivated to pay voluntary; Austrians were
second highest; and Hungarians were the least motivated to pay their taxes voluntarily
(F(687, 2) = 26.24, p < .001, ηp
2 = .07). Austrians felt less committed to pay their taxes
than Finnish and Hungarian participants (F(687, 2) = 13.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .04).
However, concerning intended tax behaviour, no diﬀerence was observed between the
three countries (F(687, 2) = 1.63, p = .20, ηp
2 = .01). Table 1 shows means and standard
deviations separately for Austria, Finland, and Hungary.
Test of the extended slippery slope framework of tax compliance
To test whether the assumed dynamics between power and trust were related to tax com-
pliance intention via perceived climates and motivations, we conduced serial mediation
analyses (Process Model 6; Hayes 2012, 2013), controlling for participants’ country. The
ﬁrst analysis comprised coercive power as a predictor and tax compliance as criterion,
whereby implicit trust, antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance were the mediators
(Figure 2(a)). Results showed a full mediation (95% CI [−0.0995; −0.0301], R2 = .04).
Coercive power was related to implicit trust, which inﬂuences a perceived antagonistic
climate (b =−.28, SE = .03, p < .001) and in turn tax compliance intention (b =−.08, SE
= .03, p = .03; 95% CI [−0.0080; −0.0001]). In addition, results showed that coercive
power was related to implicit trust (b =−.15, SE = .05, p = .002), which directly inﬂuences
tax compliance intention (b = .12, SE = .03, p > .001; 95% CI [−0.0329; −0.0034]); and that
coercive power was also related to enforced compliance (b = .29, SE = .04, p < .001), which
in turn impacts tax compliance (b =−.08, SE = .03, p < .13; 95% CI [−0.0281; −0.0002]).
The country controls were not signiﬁcant (all p’s > .08).
The second analysis comprised legitimate power as predictive and tax compliance as
criterion, whereby reason-based trust, service climate, and voluntary cooperation were
the mediators (Figure 2(b)). Controlling for the country, we found no full mediation
(95% CI [−0.0049;−0.2211], R2 = .03). However, a partial mediation was found from legit-
imate power to reason-based trust (b = .81, SE = .04, p < .001), and to tax compliance
intention (b = .15, SE = .06, p = .01; 95% CI [.247; 0.2507]). The country controls are not
signiﬁcant (all p’s > .08).
The third analysis comprised implicit trust as a predictor and tax compliance intention
as criterion, whereby conﬁdence climate and committed cooperation were the mediators
(Figure 2(c)). Controlling for the country, we found that the impact of implicit trust on
intended tax compliance was fully mediated (95% CI [0.062; 0.1030], R2 = .08). Implicit
trust was related to a conﬁdence climate (b = .44, SE = .03, p < .001), which inﬂuences com-
mitted cooperation (b = .12, SE = .04, p = .008) and in turn tax compliance intention (b
= .23, SE = .04, p > .001; 95% CI [−0.0027; 0.0259]). In addition, results showed that
implicit trust impacted committed cooperation (b = .29, SE = .03, p < .001) and then tax
compliance (b = .22, SE = .04, p < .001; 95% CI [−0.0336; 0.0849]). The country controls
were not signiﬁcant (all p’s > .08).
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Discussion
The present paper examined the dynamic between power and trust as outlined in the
extended slippery slope framework in three diﬀerent countries that vary in tax regulations
and citizens’ trust. The aim was to shed light on how classical deterrence instruments of
audits and ﬁnes and alternative approaches of participation, fairness, and trust approaches
impact relationship climates, motivation to comply, and intended tax compliance. There-
fore, the present paper also informs the broader study of tax policy by highlighting that
authorities’ instruments do not impact taxpayers’ compliance in a vacuum but change
the relationship climate between tax authorities and taxpayers and the motivation of tax-
payers. Thus, the present paper sheds light on complex, underlying psychological mech-
anisms that enable power and trust to indirectly – versus directly – aﬀect tax compliance.
Survey results from taxpayers conﬁrm most assumptions of the extended framework and
show that country speciﬁcs are marginal.
As expected, coercive power was negatively related to implicit trust and in turn to an
antagonistic climate, with an enforced motivation to comply, and ﬁnally to intended tax
compliance. In the mediation, country speciﬁcs did not have an eﬀect on the mediations.
Speciﬁcally, results showed independently from countries that mediators likely lead to a
negative relationship with tax compliance intention, which also extends and conﬁrms
existing empirical ﬁndings (Gangl et al. 2013; Hofmann et al. 2014, 2017).
In the mediator analysis, results showed that for all countries, legitimate power posi-
tively impacted tax compliance intention only via reason-based trust. This result
conﬁrms previous studies about the relationship between legitimacy and trust in police
studies (Jackson et al. 2012) and tax research (e.g. Gangl et al. 2013; Hartl et al. 2015;
Verboon and van Dijke 2011) and again highlights the unconﬁned positive eﬀect of legit-
imate power on trust, motivation, and compliance.
Results conﬁrm that the impact of implicit trust on tax compliance intentions is
mediated via a perceived conﬁdence climate and committed cooperation. Again,
country characteristics are only marginally relevant for this relationship. These ﬁndings
extend previous empirical research on the importance of implicit trust for climates and
motivations (Gangl et al. 2016). In addition, this result highlights the importance of tax
authorities’ instruments that foster implicit trust. Marketing measures (Cyan, Koumpias,
and Martinez-Vazquez 2017), the communication of warmth and friendliness (e.g. via a
website, telephone hotline, or oﬃcers), the use of symbols of legitimacy (e.g. ﬂags,
stamps, certiﬁcations; Gangl, Torgler, and Kirchler 2016), or highlighting shared values
can increase tax motivation as a moral duty and in turn improve tax compliance
intentions.
The present research has clear practical implications. Whereas coercive power can have
negative side-eﬀects, fostering legitimate power seems to have a positive impact on a large
set of indicators such as trust, climate, motivation, and compliance. Thus, tax authorities’
instruments that aim to increase their perceived law-abiding behaviour, professionalism,
and expertise; provide clear and transparent information on tax procedures; and foster a
positive reputation as a service provider can increase citizens’ trust and cooperation. Tax
authorities should also consider ways to increase taxpayers’ implicit trust. Such measures
(e.g. building a long-term relationship between a speciﬁc tax oﬃcer and taxpayer) have a
signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence on compliance.
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The present research must be considered in light of speciﬁc strengths and limitations. A
clear strength of the present research is the examination of taxpayer data from three
countries with diﬀerent legislation and citizens’ levels of trust. Since most assumptions
of the eSSF received support among all countries, they can be seen as relatively robust.
A limitation of the present research is that only intentions and not real behaviour was
assessed. However, intentions are predictors of fraudulent behaviour (Carpenter and
Reimers 2005); thus, the present results may have some validity for the ﬁeld.
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